I just have to say that in regard to the deteriorating situation with the
Soviet Union Russian Federation, it does not appear that either the EU or the US have their best thinkers working on it. I think US leaders have misunderstood Putin from the beginning and I see very little to convince me that Obama’s people, the Congress, or any other high level functionaries known to me have a clue how to get their arms around Russian behavior or a workable diplomacy.
Certainly recent (post-Ford) US incursions into foreign lands with troops or drones have taken us off the moral high ground in this regard. How can the US lecture Russia on the invasion of Crimea when we invaded Iraq based on lies, subterfuge, and outright errors?
Bush 43 and Clinton had historical opportunities to gain better alliance with Russia. But we supported Yeltsin in the Clinton years and ignored Putin’s offers of assistance after 9/11. The Russian people were mystified when the US supported Yeltsin, widely regarded as a drunken buffoon. Gorbachev’s memoirs paint a lackluster and untrustworthy picture of Yeltsin. And the US has done nothing but confirm Putin’s paranoia about US intentions by adding membership to NATO, ABM’s in Poland, petroleum wars in the middle east, and the general appearance of weakness by in-house political fratricide.
We have no use for milquetoast administrations like Obama’s, nor do we need rabid swingin’ dicks like John McCain or his hawkish brethren. We do need Russian and Slavic scholars who speak the language and understand the history of Russia at least back to Peter the Great. They can be immigrants from former Soviet territories of the ilk of Zbigniew Brzezinski, Madeleine Albright, or even a world savvy guy like Henry Kissinger. Who are the current brain trust for eastern European politics and is the CIA giving them good intelligence? Did the CIA predict the takeover of Crimea?
The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) has publically expressed dismay and disappointment in a letter to Tesoro Corporation in San Antonio, TX. It is in regard the apparent unwillingness of the company to allow CSB investigators to come on site and continue with the investigation of an industrial accident or, if you prefer, incident. Apparently two workers were splashed with sulfuric acid and had to be choppered out for treatment.
From what I gather from the CSB letter, Tesoro doesn’t believe that the incident rises to the level of seriousness to justify a CSB investigation. That is my own interpretation.
At first blush it would seem that Tesoro has a point. While it is something that OSHA would cover, does it really necessitate attention by the CSB? By itself it seems questionable. But when you consider that Tesoro had an 7-fatality explosion and fire at its Anacortes refinery in April of 2010, perhaps the scrutiny seems less unreasonable.
The refinery explosion was determined to result from high temperature hydrogen attack within a 40 year old shell and tube heat exchanger. Catastrophic structural failure on startup after a scheduled tube cleaning resulted in an explosion and fire with immediate and delayed fatalities.
It seems to me that the failure of a high temperature heat exchanger after 40 years of service handling hydrogen and naphtha has more to do management policy on equipment service life than anything else. This speaks to prudent administrative and engineering controls on plant safety. A shell and tube heat exchanger has no moving parts to fail. It just sits motionless doing it’s function. There are no failing parts to replace other than leaky tubes and valves. Perhaps no one considered that the inherent nature of the gas and thermal cycling was deleterious to the integrity of the metal shell? Perhaps there was no enthusiasm to define official hours of operating life. Plant managers are always under pressure to minimize operating costs. This is especially true of plants producing high volume low margin commodities.
But here is the rub. Everything has a failure rate. This is especially critical for equipment under high temperature and pressure. The first layer of administrative control is for management to make allowances for materials in extreme environments. Anacortes is not the only recent incident where component failure has occurred in equipment performing under demanding conditions. Before the engineers can make equipment specifications for this, management has to conform to the notion that some parts of a plant should have better definition on service life. They should demand it of their design people and support engineering when the time comes to replace a component.
If the CSB believes that a company has weak administrative controls that influence plant safety, then I think they should investigate.
Being a devotee of the HBO series True Detective I became intrigued with the purported allusions to the 1895 book of short stories The King in Yellow by Richard W. Chambers. I received my copy from Amazon yesterday and read the first three stories.
I have never ventured into the horror genre so this is refreshing. Chambers was reportedly influenced by Ambrose Bierce. His prose is considerably less dense than Bierce’s- closer to a 20th century cadence and vocabulary. H.P. Lovecraft took notice of Chambers as well. Lovecraft and Bierce are next on my reading list.
As with the story line of True Detective, The King in Yellow (or Yellow King) is not really centered on the fictional play of the same name. Rather, it is a kind of story telling device that motivates and launches characters along the arc of another story. It’s an interesting device.
I have been an advocate of thorium based nuclear power for a long time. There are certain advantages that thorium based nuclear technology has over uranium and plutonium systems that make it appealing, as long as the nuclear genie is out of the bottle anyway. Others have written about this and there is no point in my wasting bandwidth on it here. Fort St. Vrain Generating Station, one of the very few HTGR Thorium plants ever operated in the US sat a half hour from here from 1979 to 1989. As prototypical operations go, the plant had a history of upsets and unforeseen complications and was decommissioned after a decade of sub-commercial output. Eventually the plant was converted to a natural gas turbine plant and runs to this day in that capacity.
So it was of interest to learn that the venerable European company Solvay has teamed up with AREVA to develop thorium technology. Uranium and rare earth processing, as well as other minerals produce side streams enriched in thorium. According to the link, both players have been accumulating inventories of thorium. Hmmm. What could they be up to…?
Five months past treatment for throat cancer I will set aside The Squamous Chronicles and instead post The Adenocarcinoma Chronicles. Having won the advanced prostate cancer lottery as well, my current adventures involve treatment below the beltline. Here are my impressions of the experience to date.
Physicians, or more specifically in this context, oncologists, are ethically constrained to apply agreed upon treatments for the indications presented by the patient. I have gotten no “off-label” kind of advice up to now. In my case, my PSA was 39 and the biopsy readings from the pathologist were assigned Gleason 9. Well, sonofabitch. That was a fine kettle of fish. Looks like my watchful waiting was long in the waiting and too light in the watchfulness.
The standard treatment regimen in my case is hormone ablation and radiation. For hormone ablation I have had Degarelix and Lupron. For radiation I have begun IMRT (Intensity Modulated Radiation Therapy) with a dose of 76 Gy to the targeted tissue mass. I asked about scatter dose to the testes just because of the obvious proximity. The Rad Onc looked it up and said it was 1 Gy. I then pointed out that I’ve had a goodly bit of radiation in the last year and was there anyone who keeps a running total on the cumulative dose? As expected, the answer was “no” followed quickly by the standard rationale that the disease was far more dangerous than the radiation. I’d say the same thing I suppose.
Things that my docs are reluctant to offer are opinions on how this whole disease plays out. There seem to be several elements to this reticence. First, predicting the future is difficult, especially with a stochastic phenomenon like cancer radiotherapy. Second, there are good reasons for the doc to not focus on gloomy topics like life expectancy, especially if the survival stats are not the best. Most people at some point spontaneously think of cancer as a death sentence. At present I view it as a chronic condition that will play out stepwise in terms of a convergent treatment and remission series that eventually ends with refractory and widespread disease. Seems pretty obvious. It is the time-scale that I am uncertain of.
I am writing about this because my treatment regimen seems relatively ordinary to this point given the status of the condition. Perhaps there are some fellows who have yet to climb on this train who are uncertain of where it goes. This is my journey and I’ll pass along my notes.
Now 14 treatments into radiation. With the help of medical textbooks ordered from Amazon, I have slowly been learning more about the disease and the treatment. During my weekly consult with the Rad-Onc I asked the question- “What was the T number from the pathologists notes?” He replied it was T3c N1. The N1 means there is a node involved so it’s Stage 4 cancer. No one actually came out and said this to me so I had to ask. It is one thing to suspect it and another to hear it. Hard to say if this knowledge is in some way empowering.